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REVIEWING JUDICIAL REVIEW
By CLARENCE E. MANION*
I am always very highly complimented to have it inferred
that I have, or have had, things in common with our dis-
tinguished President, Mr. Cole. About the only pleasant rec-
ollection that I have with reference to the late lamented sena-
torial notion that we both shared is the fact that he, too, was
mistaken about it, and for that reason there can be no great
and grave reflection upon the immaturity of my judgment.
Whether or not any good came of this abortive effort on both
our parts is somewhat questionable, and the question may
even be more seriously raised after I have finished here this
afternoon, because it seems that the ambition and the man-
ner in which we followed it up have had some indirect con-
nection with my presence here in the role of a speech-maker.
I am really very seriously ambarrassed here this afternoon
because I lack proper equipment necessary to a speech before
such an important and distinguished body.
Eddie Rickenbacker came here a couple of years ago and
told us about a friend of his down in New York who was
very seriously interested in the fanfare of publicity that at
one time attended the establishment of nudism in the United
States. The tabloids all played up these ladies and gentle-
men in interesting poses and a great many people in the
country heard a little something about it.
*Address of Clarence E. Manion, Professor of Law at Notre Dame Uni-
versity School of Law, delivered at the mid-winter meeting of the Indiana
State Bar Association January 16, 1937.
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Well, Rickenbacker's friend was lunching in New York one
day and brought the subject up, and his companion at lunch,
somewhat diffidently confessed that he was a nudist, and he
followed it up by the declaration that some of the best peo-
ple in New York, both men and women, were nudists. He
further stated that over on Long Island there was an estab-
lishment that flourished every summer, where these people
met in the absolute-absolute, for thirty or sixty days. He added
that these same distinguished ladies and gentlemen during
the winter time convened periodically in the City of New York
in some of the brown stone mansions of that city just to avoid
any self-consciousness that might attend them the next summer.
They sort of kept in practice, so to speak, at these dinners
and bridge parties, in going without any clothes.
Well, this friend of Rickenbacker's expressed a great in-
terest, an almost avid interest, in knowing who these dis-
tinguished ladies and gentlemen in New York were. Finally,
his friend said, "Well, this is rather an exclusive company,
but possibly I can get you an invitation to one of these winter
parties. I don't know; I will attempt it."
In due course he called this chap on the telephone. He said,
"You recall the subject-matter of our conversation the other
day?"
"Yes."
"Well, you are going to get an invitation. It is going to
look like any other invitation. It is going to call for your
presence at such and such a number on Riverside Drive. Put
on your dinner clothes and report at the time indicated, and
by all means, evince no surprise or self-consciousness or fear,
because I have promised these people that you were an ex-
perienced nudist, and that you take these things casually and
philosophically as Nature intended they should be taken."
This young man was all a-twitter. He got himself ready,
dressed meticulously, and was driven to the indicated address.
The butler responded to his call-wearing merely a monocle
and a loin cloth. He asked our friend to come in. In spite
of all the injunctions about studied complacency he was turn-
ing his hat from side to side. He followed the butler down
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the aisle and obeyed his instructions to step into the undress-
ing room. In this room there were evidences that a great
many men and women had undressed there recently. All sorts
of clothing, intimate and otherwise, hung about with reckless
abandon.
The butler told our friend to "Proceed." He proceeded
and finally got himself all dressed for the nudist party. Inci-
dentally he was a little late. He could hear the music and
the tinkling of glasses down the hall, and when he was all
finished and quite ready, he followed the butler down the hall
to the living room. The butler said, "You will step behind
me onto the balcony and take your bow, and then you will
walk down the steps into the well of the living room."
So the butler stepped out and announced, "Mr. John Brown,
of New York." Whereupon there was a roll of drums, and
Mr. John Brown of New York stepped out and took his bow,
and was received by an assembly of 150 ladies and gentle-
men, all fully and completely dressed.
I have verified the truth of that story, and now I know
exactly how the gentlemen felt because here I am, announced
in the role of a speech-maker and nude of anything that would
be of value or interest to the aristocracy of Indiana's legal
profession.
Nevertheless, I am going to speak for a very few minutes
about a subject that I would not have had the temerity to
broach a month ago. I would have hesitated to discourse
about this topic because it appeared to me to be so elemental
and so axiomatic that almost anybody, and certainly lawyers,
would have a complete and clearcut understanding of it. It
appeared to me that if anyone rose in front of a learned gath-
ering like this and talked about it, he would simply be asking
too much of their indulgence.
But about two weeks ago, during the Christmas vacation,
I had the honor to read a paper before the Jurisprudence Sec-
tion of what is known as the American Association of Law
Schools in Chicago. There were about a hundred law pro-
fessors present at that section and these representatives teach
at law schools scattered all over the United States. I was
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very much surprised to find some of these simple things that
I want to mention to you, categorically denied and expounded
against by these very learned gentlemen who are teaching in
a great many of our best schools.
Either I am all wrong or something very serious has hap-
pened to our country, and particularly to the law of it, in
the last ten or fifteen years. I do not make these remarks
in any spirit of criticism .for those who were present, those
who entered into the discussion or those who discussed the
thing with me privately after it was over. I refer to the inci-
dent merely to emphasize the seriousness with which I make
this rather brief observation.
I gave Mr. Batchelor a title for this speech. I called it,
"Reviewing Judicial Review." It was the question of judicial
review, that is, the right of judges to review the laws of our
government for their constitutionality, to review the acts of
our executives for their consistency with the constitution and
to review even the acts of the judges themselves, for possible
breach of constitutional limits, that was under fire in our dis-
cussion at Chicago. The professors were strongly against
judicial review and could see no reason for it.
Now, hearing this viewpoint presented and hearing these
elemental facts denied was as startling to me as if learned
professors of literature had suddenly risen up and denied the
existence of such a thing as an alphabet. Nevertheless, the
view was put forward seriously and most earnestly. Perhaps
there are many gentlemen here who agree with the professors
who talked to me and at me in Chicago. A great many people
may believe that our courts are holding back the progress of
our country without any reasonable or constitutional justifi-
cation but their arrogance.
I am convinced now that unless this general impression or
misapprehension about judicial review is promptly reversed
and corrected, the day will soon come when no court in the
United States will be permitted to set aside the act of any
legislature in the United States, State or Federal.
I believe that this hostile attitude with reference to judicial
review is traceable to the perspective that has been taken by
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people who have looked at it critically. One reason why many
people now write books about nine old men sitting on the lid
of our constitutional opportunities, and otherwise hold the
principle of judicial review up to ridicule, is the misappre-
hension of the judges themselves with reference to the char-
acter of the thing they are doing when they test a law for
its constitutionality.
Let me illustrate the point by giving you an illustration
that happened in the classroom. I teach Constitutional Law
in Notre Dame-at least I preside over the classes.
One day a chap came to me and said, "Mr. Manion, I have
looked through our new Constitutional law case book and find
that there are no English cases cited in it. I have English
cases in my sales book and my property case book is cluttered
with English citations. All my other case books have English
authorities, but I don't find any English cases in this Con-
stitutional Law case book, and I wonder for that reason, if
it is a good book. I wonder if it goes back far enough."
Now, that question brings our discussion into focus.
The principle of judicial review as we well know, or ought
to know, is a distinctly American institution. There is no
other country in the world where you may have such a thing
as an unconstitutional law. When that fact is isolated and
laid out for examination it becomes somewhat startling. We
generally assume that all of our law is of Anglo-Saxon origin,
that it was channeled into this country from Great Britain,
that it is the exemplification of democratic ideals, and that
it naturally finds its counterparts and its parallels in other
so-called democratic countries. But let me reassert that only
here can there be such a thing as an unconstitutional law. Only
here can an individual citizen walk into a court and say, "Nay"
to the vast majority or even the unanimous declaration of
State and Federal Legislatures. Such a procedure is unthink-
able to the political scientists of the rest of the world. Why
is this revolutionary procedure permitted in America? Pre-
cisely because this is the only practical method by which the
individual citizen can force his government to protect his in-
dividual God-given rights. In no country, outside of the
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United States, not even excluding England, does any citizen
have any rights which his government is bound to respect.
My professional compatriots object to judicial review be-
cause they see it merely as an impediment to Democracy. They
overlook the fact that it is an indispensable method of pro-
tecting natural individual rights. When this fact was pointed
out to them they denied the existence of any individual right
that is important enough to set aside the will of a majority
of the people as expressed in a law of the land. If the rights
of individuals stand in the way of what is termed, for the
time being at least, as "progress," they would sweep the in-
dividual rights aside-as is done in other countries of the
world.
Now, I think it is high time for us to scrape our feet a
little and see what is under them. We have been taking our
legal foundations for granted for a great number of years.
Those of you who have lived some time in Indianapolis will
remember that a number of years ago the eight-story Tele-
phone Building then on Meridian Street was moved onto an
adjoining lot and faced in another direction. The telephone
service in and through the City of Indianapolis was not even
interrupted while that work was going on. One man employed
in the building at the time told me at lunch the other day
that he had to go outside occasionally to make sure that the
building was really moving.
I wonder if much the same thing may not be said of the
law of our land in America today. I wonder if the super-
structure is not being shifted over to another foundation while
our service in and through the building continues to distract
our attention from the basic change that is taking place.
But what, after all, is the basic foundation of our American
Law and Government? How many of us are prepared to
locate and describe that foundation?
I have heard and you have heard a great many stentorian-
defenses of our "American fundamental principles," and they
usually resolve themselves into a bombast of denunciation
against Communism, Fascism, Socialism and Anarchy ending
with a peroration extolling our democratic traditions. Now,
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just how much firm substance can we find in our "democratic
traditions," so-called? It is just as possible to have a demo-
cratic dictatorship as it is to have a fascist dictatorship or a
communistic dictatorship of the proletariat. What kind of a
dictatorship you have is merely a matter of form. It may be
a democratic form, a fascist form, or soviet form. We have
been concerned too much in this country with our American
form of government and have not concerned ourselves suffi-
ciently about the American substance of government. The
substance and not the form of our government is the thing
that differentiates the United States from all other countries
of the world. Unless the substance of American government
is unique and different from that of any other country in the
world, then the procedure of judicial review is merely an
antiquated impediment to progressive democratic tendencies
and ought to be abolished.
Nobody regretted any more sincerely than I did many of
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, but be-
cause the Supreme Court of the United States decided a case
your way instead of mine, certainly does not mean that I must
abandon my faith in judicial processes. By the same token,
when the court reverses as unconstitutional some act in which
I believe'and am seriously interested, it does not by that fact
give me a good reason for deserting my faith in the principle
of judicial review. Let me ask you gentlemen this question,
what possible protection could the individual have in a country
where judicial review is not permitted?
What is the fundamental American principle? Principle
comes from the Latin work "Principium" meaning beginning,
and a good place to look for the principle of American Gov-
ernment, it seems to me, is at the beginning of American
Government, namely, 1776.
If I may believe what I heard at this Chicago symposium,
there were not over half a dozen men there out of the one
hundred present, who would have signed the American Dec-
laration of Indpendence if it had been submitted to them, for
the reason that if one believes what is said in the Declara-
tion of Independence he must acknowledge the existence of
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individual natural rights and must therefore insist upon judi-
cial review as a means for their protection. Here is what
the Declaration says:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
Now, hearken to what comes next:
"To secure these rights, governments are instituted amongst men."
This is why government functions in the United States. We
habitually and. too much concern ourselves with what the gov-
ernment is doing and how it is doing it and not sufficiently
with why Government is called upon to act at all. I challenge
you to look at the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court handed down during the last twenty years. You will
find that the court in sitting in judgment upon the acts of
Congress as well as when it considers the acts of the State
Legislatures, in nine cases out of ten, determines the pro-
priety of the Statute in question with exclusive reference to
how it was done, never seriously considering why it was done.
How a thing is accomplished is a mere matter of method but
"why" it is done is a matter of principle. I could go back to
South Bend tonight in one of a half dozen ways. I might go
by air, by rail or by motor. I might even skate up north of
Road 30, but the important thing is that I am going to South
Bend. South Bend is my objective. South Bend is primary
and fundamental. The method that I adopt in order to get
there is a secondary thing. The method and form of Ameri-
can Government are secondary considerations-the aim and
objective of our government is what I regard as fundamental
American principles.
The aim and objective of government in this country is the
protection of God-given natural rights. That principle ob-
tains no place else in the world. There is no other gov-
ernment on earth that has erected its superstructure of law
upon that basic premise, and it is precisely because of this
peculiar foundation of our government that our courts have
the temerity to review laws of the legislature, acts of Presi-
dents and Governors, and acts of courts as well. That is the
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reason why our courts now take that type of jurisdiction.
While all our courts still take jurisdiction in such cases, many
of them have forgotten the reason why they do so.
If judicial review is unpopular it is precisely because judges
have focussed their attention upon the letter of constitutional
restraint and have allowed that letter to eclipse the spirit of
our entire governmental institution. In spite of what Shake-
speare said about a rose, I insist that the name by which a
thing is called eventually changes public psychology with ref-
erence to it. Our Courts have built the impression that con-
stitutional limitations are fences keeping our liberties im-
prisoned rather than barriers keeping our trespassers upon
our rights. A generation of such impressions will make the
unpopularity of the constitution second only to that of the
judges.
Suppose we were in the habit of referring to our homes
not as a shelter for our protection and our security, but as
a jail for our confinement. How long would we have to tell
the youngsters to "go to jail" when we intended that they
should go home before we changed the home into the most
distasteful institution in America?
Yet, we have been content to call our Constitution a limi-
tation upon the functions of government without ever men-
tioning why Government is called upon to function in the
first place.
You would never think of describing your automobile solely
in the language of the traffic cop who slows you down. You
seldom think of your car as a thing that can go only 90 miles
an hour. You do not visualize it in terms of what it cannot
do. On the contrary, you think of it properly as a vehicle
that is intended to bring you from place to place. You think"
of it as a vehicle that has a positive and serviceable job to do
for you. Why do we not think of our Constitution and our
Government in the same positive way? Courts leave us with
the impression that the Constitution is a series of barbed wire
fences, arbitrarily placed in the path of Progress. Why do
they not give space in their decisions to the reason for the
broad field of governmental activity which the constitutional
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fences properly enclose? Why are we not reminded that an
unlimited government would be tyranny while a properly
limited.-governmental agency is the best and only protection
for all your rights?
Government began in America in 1776, and was given its
direction and its objective at that time. It is not sufficient
merely to say that in this country an individual has rights
which his government is bound to respect. That is a nega-
tive way of approaching the unique principle of our American
system. A better way of approaching it is to say that in
America government has power only for the protection of
individual citizens. That is why our government functions.
It is a protective agency and yet how do we traditionally refer
to our Statutes? We talk about laws that regulate public
utilities. Those laws do not regulate public utilities; they
protect the consumers of light and power. We speak of
"speed limits" and laws which regulate our conduct on the
streets and highways. But these laws are not regulations of
our speed and conduct; on the contrary they are protections
for pedestrians and others who may use the same streets and
highways that we are using.
Our courts for years have talked about reasonable regu-
lation of the police power, when they might better have re-
ferred to it as reasonable and adequate protection for the
individual. The repetition of that protective phraseology
would have given us a different psychology. We would now
regard our government for what it is, for what the Declara-
tion of Independence says it is, namely, a protection for our
rights.
Now, strangely enough, in your practice of the law, you
recognize that protective fact is elemental. A man is sued
for violating the rights of another. My liberty lets me go
just so far and beyond that is the field of my neighbors' rights.
If I invade that field, I am a trespasser and I am consequently
hailed into court. Yet while practicing law day in and day
out upon that theory, a lawyer will get up at the Rotary Club
or some other place and talk about the necessity for liberty
giving way before the common good.
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That is what I heard in Chicago, namely, that liberty must
give way before the common good.
But liberty does not give way before the common good.
To say that is to embrace the theory of a system that used
to be attributed to the Hottentots, in which a young male
member of the tribe could demonstrate his complete manhood,
only be beating his own mother.
We have never had and we can never expect to have any
real and general welfare as a result of the destruction of in-
dividual rights. Such general welfare as we have comes about
because of the protection of individual rights and not because
of the destruction of those rights or any of them.
This misplacement of perspective is destroying the founda-
tion of American Government. The reason why a thing is
done is just as important, often even more important, than
the thing itself. Not merely what our government does, but
the theory upon which it does it is vital to the preservation
of our distinctively American principles. What government
does in the United States is or should be justified if it is done
in the interest of protection for each and all of our citizens
who have appointed American Government as their protec-
tive agency for the preservation of their rights.
Now, ninety-nine per cent of the Statutes that we have in
Indiana and the United States today could be justified by ap-
proaching their constitutionality from the protective angle. At
the same time many progressive statutes that have been reject-
ed as "unreasonable" regulations could have been justified as
necessary and modern protections for rights that are jeopard-
ized by modern conditions. Compulsory safety and fire protec-
tions; minimum wages; maximum hours; prohibition of child
labor; sweat shops; sale of fraudulent securities, and countless
other measures are literally commanded by the spirit of our
American Government objective. Whether the immediate
proposal for the accomplishment of these things is interstate
or intrastate commerce, or whether it involves a delegation of
powers to the Executive is a mere question of constitutional
form and not one of constitutional substance.
The spirit of our institutions calls for an up-to-date mod-
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ern protection for the rights which each individual or groups
of individuals has to be immune from attack by other indi-
viduals or groups of individuals, and that has been and still
is the genius of our system. That is the sole reason why our
courts have always upon the petition of some aggrieved in-
dividual, sat in judgment upon the propriety of a law of
Congress or of the State Legislature.
Our courts have no other excuse for entertaining such a
petition. It is not that the court has a veto power over the
Legislature. It is simply that the court is and always has been
the place where an individual goes when his rights are vio-
lated, either by Citizen A or Citizen B or his government.
The Constitution of the United States, it is true, does not
say the courts can reverse the laws of Congress; it does not
need to. Authority in the letter of the Constitution for this
procedure would not add one jot to the court's power in this
respect. By the very nature of our government, rights are
reserved in each individual. According to American theory
there is a private right of sanctuary in each person into which
no other person, not even government, may go. When that
individual's rights are violated, he naturally goes to court,
either to sue A or B, to get an injunction against A or B, or
to get an injunction against his government, because when
government proceeds without authority the governmental
agent proceeds merely as a private individual, and conse-
quently, the natural place to go with this complaint about
ultra vires act on the part of government, is the court.
Now, these considerations, which I have always regarded
as very fundamental and thoroughly axiomatic, are not being
held any more because we have confused the issue with cer-
tain catch phrases about "democracy." I saw a pamphlet the
other night which pictured the Spirit of '76, the three fellows
with the flag, the fife, and the drum over the inscription:
"Communism is Twentieth Century Democracy."
That is purely an emotional appeal to the susceptible. It
shows that Democracy can be represented to mean anything.
As I said at the outset, mere democracy is not the founda-
tion of our American system. Let's go back to the Declara-
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tion of Independence again. "To secure these rights, gov-
ernments are instituted amongst men, deriving their just pow-
ers from the consent of the governed."
How the governmental agent is to function is to be de-
termined by majority vote, but why he is hired is definitely
settled long before the Declaration of Independence ever
mentions democracy or the consent of the governed. How
your agent may achieve your purpose is a thing you put into
your contract with him. You may hire him to sell real estate.
How he is to sell it, prices, limitations upon the character of
his vendees, extent of his commission: those are things that go
into the written terms of your contract, but the purpose for
which he is hired, is completely understood at the time you
begin your original negotiations. The governmental agent in
this country was hired to preserve rights and our successive
American constitutions, State and Federal, told how the agent
was to proceed in the preservation of this fundamental pur-
pose. We have put the cart before the horse, the means be-
fore the end. As a people we have come to think of the con-
stitution as a source of rights rather than a protection for
rights which existed long before the Constitution was made.
Nine out of ten Americans now regard majority rule as the
underlying principle of our American system, but it is not, and
reference to the elemental document which underlies our
American system will prove that it is not.
When you step out of that door this afternoon, some burly
fellow may push you into a corner and take your pocketbook
from you. Meantime I may step out of this door and 150
burly fellows may take mine. Your purse is gone, and mine
is gone. Does the fact that my pocketbook was taken by 150
men make my loss less severe than yours? We have both
been robbed; you by an individual and I by a multitude. The
important thing is that you have rights as against that thief,
and I have rights as against the mob. The fundamental prin-
ciple of our system enables you and me to assert that right
against both, and the Constitution of the United States was
written for no other purpose except to protect individuals and
minorities in such situations. And remember again, that mi-
norities have no such protection anywhere else in the world.
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It is useless to repeat and revere the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, on the 4th of July, unless you assert and maintain a
practical remedy in the hands of each person for the protec-
tion of those natural rights that the Declaration speaks about.
Occasionally, not nearly often enough, in my opinion, courts
of the States and Nation have spoken of the Declaration of
Independence as being the spirit of that of which the Consti-
tution of the United States is merely the letter. What causes
dissatisfaction on the part of the multitude of our population
are opinions of the Supreme Court which exalt the letter of
State and Federal Constitutions and obscure the spirit of both.
Such decisions always stimulate a great clamor for taking
from the Supreme Court its right to do such a reviewing job
and therein lies the real and destructive danger.
I believe that there is room in our Government under the
Constitution for the establishment of full, complete and abso-
lute protection for all our individuals in modern society.
Years ago one method of protection may have been sufficient,
and adequate. Now we need many more. A few years ago
the Chief Justice of our Supreme Court, Justice Hughes,
wrote into his decision of the Minnesota Mortgage Case, so-
called, this statement, in substance:
"The complexity of our modern society has made it necessary for
us to make an increased use of government in order to protect the very
basis of individual opportunity."
This is a concise statement of the answer of our American
system to the challenge of modern society.
Government is augmented and functions enlarged not to
destroy liberty but in order to give more adequate protec-
tion to it. The more frequently we indulge the misleading
assertion that liberty is an out worn anachronism that is con-
stantly retreating before the advance of the common good,
the sooner will our population begin to hold our priceless
ideals of liberty and freedom in complete contempt.
Ours is an individualistic state. Our government was
launched not on the theory that the majority of men, nor the
mere general run of men have rights, but that each man and
each woman has unalienable rights which government is bound
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to respect, rights which government is hired to protect. That
is still our American theory. If we do not believe that, our
Fourth of July celebration becomes a hypocritical sham. Ask
yourself this afternoon whether you could conscientiously sign
the Declaration of Independence. Ask yourself whether you
believe in natural rights, and what the Declaration says about
them. What ever we do, let us do it unhypocritically and
directly. If we do not believe in the reason for judicial re-
view, then let us cease a reasonless attempt to preserve it.
By defending judicial review, I am not defending the result
of all the judicial reviews. I defend merely the principle which
is tantamount to saying that government can go only so far,
and that wherever it goes it must go in the name of its pro-
tective purpose. That principle ought to be the very first syl-
lable of any study of our American Constitutional Law.
In conclusion, therefore, let me reassert that in America
we have natural rights; that the job of the American Govern-
ment is to protect them in each individual person; that the
only method for their adequate protection is resort to the
courts, the place where each individual goes when his rights
have been violated by anybody; that if you deprive the court
of its right to entertain suits involving the inherent validity
of governmental actions, you automatically destroy the one
method for protecting the natural right, and you, therefore,
and consequently, destroy the natural right itself. If it is your
purpose to deny natural rights, then, by all means, eliminate
the procedure of judicial review. But if you can and do sub-
scribe to the Declaration of Independence with its reference
to God and the rights which He put into each human soul,
then by all means let us preserve the only practical method by
which those rights can be protected, and further than that,
let us not be mistaken about the form of government as dis-
tinguished from the substance of it. We have all too often
mistaken principle for method, and vice versa. We have fre-
quently confused our destination with our various methods of
getting there. Whether something is "intra" rather than
"inter state" commerce or constitutes a delegation of legisla-
tive powers may be of great interest but it is not a matter of
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fundamental American principle. We can hardly ask even an
ardent patriot to lay down his life for either proposition.
Much of our defensive Constitutional research has been mere
shadow-boxing. We have engaged in spirited defenses of what
were often mere mirages of principle, and we have fastened
upon the public consciousness the impression that Constitu-
tional Law is a matter of juggled phrases and a complexity
of punctuation marks.
Let us give the fellow in the street a proper conception of
what American principle is, and not ask him to defend an
outlying barbed wire entanglement, while the citadel of rights
is left vulnerable, unprotected, unstudied and even unknown.
Let us not lose the substance while we fight for a shadow.
We may preserve the form, we may exalt the letter, but
if we lose the spirit, we are back on the dead drab level of
the rest of the political world. America is the only place
where the right of the individual was ever made the basic
conception of government, and against that conception the
force of parallel and precedent have constantly pressed ever
since 1776. Our resistance is beginning to flatten out. Soon
what is left of our resistance may give way. State absolutism
will then be enthroned here as it is elsewhere in the world.
When that day comes the question of blood purges, mercy
deaths, property confiscation, Aryan supremacy and other
lively topics will immediately assume more than a mere aca-
demic interest for us.
The way for the courts, for lawyers, for legislatures, for
the rank and file to look at our American system is to sense
its spirit, and subordinate its letter. A reversal of this pro-
cedure will destroy us. I have it on the authority of St. Paul,
I believe, that the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.
